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A B S T R A C T
Focusing on discourses by the ruling elite, this article examines the construction of ‘geo-
political spaces’ in Russian foreign policy. Based on a critical geopolitical analysis, suggesting
that territory, space and geographies are being actively (re)formulated by those in power,
this article analyzes how policy-makers deﬁne and articulate the importance of a partic-
ular geographical region for their foreign policy. It analyzes how the three ‘geopolitical spaces’
– Eurasia, the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Paciﬁc – are deﬁned by Russia’s political leaders
and how each space fulﬁls a particular function for the pursuit of Russian interests abroad.
In a second part, this article takes into account the events in and around Ukraine starting
in late 2013 and analyzes how Russia’s discourse toward the traditional ‘geopolitical spaces’
changed as a result. It is argued, that while Russia previously strived for membership in
each of the three ‘geopolitical spaces’, the Ukraine crisis and its impact on Moscow’s re-
lation with the West led to a reorientation of Russia’s geopolitical vision toward the East
and most importantly toward Eurasia. The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union
was instrumental for the promotion of a new vision of wider Eurasian integration.
Copyright © 2016 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
This article focuses on the importance of ‘space’ and geo-
political arguments in the formulation of a country’s foreign
policy. It is embedded in wider debates around the impor-
tance of geography and space in international relations (Starr,
2013a). The concentration lies on foreign policy as a dis-
cursive practice, meaning that each country deﬁnes and
constructs ‘geopolitical spaces’ which are crucial in the
pursuit of its national interests. Based on a critical geopo-
litical analysis, suggesting that territory, space and
geographies are being actively (re)formulated by those in
power, this article analyzes how policy-makers deﬁne and
articulate the importance of a particular geographical region
for their foreign policy. At the center of this article is an anal-
ysis of Russian foreign policy discourse allowing us to depict
the principal geopolitical regions with which Russia inter-
acts as well as their respective importance for Moscow.
This article examines the construction of ‘geopolitical
spaces’ in Russian foreign policy since Vladimir Putin became
President in 2000. It analyzes the way in which the three
principal ‘geopolitical spaces’ in Russian foreign policy –
Eurasia, the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-Paciﬁc – are deﬁned
by the political leadership in Moscow.1 In a second step, this
article analyzes how this traditional geopolitical imagina-
tion changed in reaction to the events in Ukraine starting
in late 2013, and with the implementation of the Eurasian
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(Economic) Union. It is argued that the crisis in Ukraine and
the subsequent deterioration of relations between Russia
and the West left a decisive imprint on the way in which
the geopolitical imagination of Russia’s leaders evolved.
Russia’s political elite considers the country to be a
member of and important actor in each of the three geo-
political spaces. For Moscow, ‘membership’ in each of these
regions is a condition for maintaining its status as a great
power in the international system.With this inmind, foreign
policy discourses are a ﬂexible means of readjusting Rus-
sia’s geopolitical vision in accordance with the general shifts
and new tendencies in global affairs. Discourses precisely
fulﬁll the function to appropriate the sovereignty over
matters of deﬁnition of particular spaces and places and to
frame Russian membership in each of these geopolitical
spaces.
In a ﬁrst step, the article brieﬂy presents the advan-
tages offered by critical geopolitics in analyzing foreign policy
and especially discourses by policy-makers. After a brief
background discussion on Russian foreign policy, the article
will move to the core of the analysis by presenting the po-
litical elite’s geopolitical discourse on Eurasia, the Euro-
Atlantic and the Asia-Paciﬁc region. Thereafter, this article
reﬂects upon the implications of the Ukraine Crisis for Rus-
sia’s geopolitical imagination and draws preliminary
conclusions on the current and future orientation of Russian
foreign policy.
2. Critical geopolitics and foreign policy
This article focuses on the geopolitical vision of Russia’s
political elite and the discourses of these “intellectuals of
statecraft” (O Tuathail &Agnew, 1992). The subsequent anal-
ysis is based on speeches and interviews by prominent
political leaders with a responsibility for external affairs, as
well as the three foreign policy concepts (FPC) of 2000, 2008
and 2013.2 The collectedmaterial has been analyzed quali-
tatively rather thanquantitatively in the sense that the article
works with direct quotes from speeches and documents.
The analysis herein focuses on the construction of ‘geo-
political spaces’. While acknowledging given geographical
and territorial realities, this article argues that with regard
to foreign policy practice, personal conceptions and inter-
pretations of these realities play a crucial role. Hence,
“geography is ‘dynamic’ in that the meaning of space, dis-
tance, territory, and borders can change in the perceptions
of peoples and foreign policy-making elites” (Starr, 2013b,
p. 439; see also Agnew, 2003, pp. 2–3). This is particularly
true in times of globalization, in which we see an increas-
ing diffusion of power across various scales and places.
Critical geopolitics focuses on how “global space is in-
cessantly reimagined and rewritten by centers of power and
authority” (O Tuathail, 1996, p. 249; see also Dalby, 1991;
Dodds, 2001; Kuus, 2010) and is interested in how geopo-
litical analysis functions as an aide in the conduct of a state’s
foreignpolicy. AsDodds argues, “thepractice of foreignpolicy
is inherently geopolitical because it involves the construc-
tionofmeaningandvaluesof spacesandplaces” (Dodds,1993,
p. 71). It would be wrong, however, to assume that foreign
policy is a stable practice. Instead, it continuously repro-
duces and reformulates state identity in response to changed
perceptions and realities in the global system. In so doing,
foreign policy becomes a state practice that aims at naming
places in order to confermeaning upon them (Agnew, 2003;
Campbell, 1992;Dijkink, 1996,pp.11–15;OTuathail&Agnew,
1992). As such, discourses are understood here as impor-
tant parts of policy-making practices through which a
country’s interests andpolicies are deﬁnedand justiﬁed, both
internally and externally (Bassin, 2004, 621; Mamadouh &
Dijkink, 2006; Müller, 2008; O Tuathail, 2002, pp. 605–607;
O Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, pp. 192–193). As such, dis-
coursesarebotha tool forpolicy, in that theyareprogrammatic
and present a vision, as well as a cause of policy, by being
reactive and trying to make sense of political actions. Since
“geopolitical reasoning operates through the active simpli-
ﬁcationof the complex realityof places in favorof controllable
geopolitical abstractions” (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995, pp.
48–49), analyzing the construction of the Eurasia, Euro-
Atlantic andAsia-Paciﬁc ‘geopolitical spaces’ in thediscursive
practices of Russia’s leaders sheds light on Russia’s oﬃcial
geopolitical vision of its place in the international system.
3. The foundations of Russian foreign policy
This study is grounded in the tradition of practical geo-
politics, which focuses on the political elite, and thus omits
a range of other actors that equally inﬂuence Russia’s geo-
political imagination. There is already a wide variety of
scholarship focusing for instance on the writings of prom-
inent academics (Tsygankov, 2003) or the examination of
geopolitical perceptions of ordinary Russians and popular
ideas about Russia’s place in the world (O’Loughlin,
O’Tuathail, & Kolossov, 2006; O’Loughlin & Talbot, 2005). In
addition to these studies, especially the work of Ted Hopf
(2002) and Anne Clunan (2009) is particularly instructive
in its engagement with the role of identity in Russian foreign
policy.
The starting point for this study is Vladimir Putin’s ac-
cession to the Russian presidency in 2000. The following
section therefore provides some historical background and
a brief overview of the debates related to Russian identity
and foreign policy in the 1990s.
The debate about the reorientation of Russian foreign
policy already started under Mikhail Gorbachev and his
policy of ‘New Thinking’ (Legvold, 1989; Mandelbaum, 1998,
pp. 4–6); however, it reached its peak in the early 1990s
during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. This was due to the fact
that, as Ted Hopf argues, “Russia found itself between two
different modern identities – that of the Soviet past and that
of the western present” (Hopf, 2002, pp. 155–156). This
opened the ﬂoor to debate among the many political fac-
tions about the meaning of the Russian nation and its place
in the world. Andrei Tsygankov identiﬁed three schools of
thought: Westernist, Statist and Civilizationist (Tsygankov,
2006, pp. 4–7; see also Tsygankov, 2005a). The Westernists
emphasized “Russia’s similarity with the West and viewed
the West as the most viable and progressive civilization in
2 The transcripts of the speeches have been obtained in English trans-
lation, in most cases directly from the websites of the President of Russia
andMinistry of Foreign Affairs. The sample includes speeches by Igor Ivanov,
Sergey Ivanov, Sergey Lavrov, Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin.
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the world” (Tsygankov, 2006, p. 4). The Statists stressed “the
state’s ability to govern and preserve the social and polit-
ical order” implying that Russia has its proper way of
developing (Tsygankov, 2006, p. 5). Finally, the Civilizationists
considered Russia to have its own Eurasianist civilization
opposed to that of the West and “the Western system of
values, insisting on the cultural superiority of Russia and
Russia-centered civilization” (Tsygankov, 2006, p. 7).
Throughout the 1990s, these discourses were in competi-
tion with each other and each took center stage at a different
moment. The accession of Vladimir Putin to the presiden-
cy in 2000 led to the implementation of a new approach
in Russian foreign policy with the aim to restore Russia’s
‘place’ in global affairs (Rumer, 2007, pp. 7–8). With Vladi-
mir Putin, Russia once again had a strong leader, capable
of deﬁning and implementing a clear foreign policy vision
and strategy.
3.1. Russia as a great power
One of the principal goals of the Russian leadership is
to establish their country among the world’s great powers
(Mankoff, 2009; Tsygankov, 2005b), according to the status
it enjoyed during the Cold War period. This historical iden-
tity is constructed on the image of Russia as a strong and
powerful country, a full member of the international com-
munity of states and an inﬂuential force in global
developments. Vladimir Putin, in his 2003 address to the
Federal Assembly, claimed that “Russia’s historic fate over
these thousand and more years” was to maintain “a state
spread over such a vast territory and preserving a unique
community of peoples while keeping up a strong pres-
ence on the international stage” (Putin, 2003). Permeating
this statement is the will to uphold a position that is deemed
worthy of a country the size and historical stature of Russia.
The practical implication being that Moscow should conduct
a foreign policy according to this role whichmeans to behave
like an independent pole and one of the principal actors in
global politics. According to Putin, this role has been con-
ferred upon Russia by its history and is a deﬁning feature
of the country:
It is hardly necessary to incite us to [play an increas-
ingly active role in world affairs]. Russia is a country with
a history that spans more than a thousand years and has
practically always used the privilege to carry out an in-
dependent foreign policy. (Putin, 2007)
This statement leaves no doubt as to Russia’s ambition
to belong to the small number of great powers which domi-
nates the international system. One of the main objectives
of Russian foreign policy, according to the FPC is to “achieve
ﬁrm and prestigious positions in theworld community, most
fully consistent with interests of the Russian Federation as
a great power” (Russian Federation, 2000). The FPC of 2013
reiterates this by stating that Russia aims at “securing its
high standing in the international community as one of the
inﬂuential and competitive poles in the modern world”
(Russian Federation, 2013).
The preoccupation with status and the role which has
been conferred upon Russia by history is characteristic of
Russian foreign policy. Post-Soviet Russian foreign policy was
built on ideas of status rather than on an objective assess-
ment of Russia’s material conditions and rational interests
(Clunan, 2009, pp. 206–207). The word used in Russia to de-
scribe this phenomenon is derzhavnost, “referring to a
preoccupationwith great power status regardless of whether
Russia has the military and economic wherewithal” (Welch
Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, pp. 78–79). Russia’s quest for
great power status is thus based on “an emotion, it is a
craving for a status that most Russians strongly believe is
theirs by right, by virtue of the enormous size of the country,
its resources, its history” (Smith, 2012, p. 40). Having lost
its status and hegemonic position in global politics after the
dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s political elite aimed at re-
establishing a similar status as soon as it consolidated
Russian power in the 2000s. In addition to losing its status,
Russia suffered a decisive loss of territory – or rather ter-
ritory controlled by Moscow. As a result, Russia had to
formulate a new geopolitical identity which differed from
its previous existence as center of the Soviet Union. The way
in which the principal regions of interaction for Russian
foreign policy are framed is the topic of the next section.
4. Geopolitical spaces in Russian foreign policy
discourse
The principal ‘geopolitical spaces’ according to Russia’s
foreign policy discourse are Eurasia, the Euro-Atlantic region
(EAR) and the Asia-Paciﬁc region (APR). These regions are
contiguous to Russia, and Russia, merely by its size and geo-
graphical location is a part of all these regions. Likewise,
these regions represent both ‘the old’ and ‘the new’ in the
sense that the Euro-Atlantic traditionally occupied the center
stage of international politics, while recent years have led
to a gradual shift to the East and the Asia-Paciﬁc in particular.
4.1. Eurasia
Among the three geopolitical spaces analyzed in this
article, the region of Eurasia is the most contested in terms
of its deﬁnition and geographical spread. However, the un-
disputed factor in deﬁnitions of Eurasia is Russia’s centrality.
For instance, the oﬃcial FPCs from 2000 and 2008 both refer
to Russia as the “largest Eurasian power” (Russian Federation,
2000, 2008). Nevertheless, there is no explanation or def-
inition of which territorial area exactly corresponds to
Eurasia. A hint as to the logic behind the deﬁnition of Russia
as a Eurasian power is given in a speech by former Defense
Minister Sergey Ivanov:
Composition of its population, spirit, culture and pre-
vailing religionsmake Russia a European country. But two
thirds of its territory and the main part of economic po-
tential are situated in Asia. We base our analysis on the
postulate of Eurasian location of Russia, its role of a
natural bridge between Europe and Asia, between two
civilizations, the role Russia has been playing for more
than one century. (Ivanov, 2001)
This statement illustrates the complexity behind the con-
struction of Russia’s geopolitical identity with regard to
Eurasia. There are different elements, ranging from geo-
graphical to economic as well as from civilizational to
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historical factors. Two underlying interlinked themes are re-
current in this construction of Eurasia and Russia’s place in
it: Russia’s centrality and the historical argument, namely
that Russia’s expansion over the last four centuries princi-
pally took place across the Eurasian landmass. Hence, the
metaphor of the bridge between the civilizations to the East
and West once again serves as a reminder that Russia is at
the center of this Eurasian space. At the same time, the his-
torical reference to the fact that Russia played this role and
occupied this space for a long time further helps to cement
this image.
The self-positioning of Russia at the center of Eurasia by
its elite lays the foundation for the policy in this space. As
Vladimir Putin asserted in his 2005 presidential address to
the Russian Federal Assembly, “Russia should continue its
civilizing mission on the Eurasian continent. This mission
consists in ensuring that democratic values, combined with
national interests, enrich and strengthen our historic com-
munity” (Putin, 2005). The historical argument in Russia’s
construction of the geopolitical space of Eurasia is crucial
because it ties Russia to other countries that share the same
historical experience. In practical terms, this then pro-
vides Russia with a certain legitimacy for pursuing its foreign
policy interests in the region. This “historic community” in
Eurasia directly refers to present-day regional groupings and
relationships with countries in Russia’s neighborhood. The
fellow former Soviet republics, most of which are re-
grouped in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
are thus a central component of the Eurasian geopolitical
space.3 Russia’s political leaders frequently allude to that
reality. Vladimir Putin considers the CIS to assume major
responsibility over issues such as “security, economic and
humanitarian cooperation in Eurasia” (Putin, 2002). The
extent to which Russia’s links to the CIS are a crucial factor
in the construction of Eurasia is understood when reading
the following statement by Sergey Ivanov:
Russia and the CIS States are linked by common history,
robust economic, cultural, and civilization bonds. […] the
good-neighborly relations with the CIS States […] they
represent themost important stability and security factor
over the vast area of Eurasia. (Ivanov, 2004)
There is also a signiﬁcant evolution in Russia’s interac-
tion with the post-Soviet space. The early years of the 2000s
were characterized byMoscow’s negligence of relations with
these countries. Several events led to a reversal of this stance
toward the mid-2000s. Chief among them are the NATO en-
largement round in 2004, as well as the color revolutions
in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), which Russia per-
ceived as an outside intervention in its traditional sphere
of interests.
More recently, the concept of Eurasia in Russian dis-
course evolved, and an institutional framework has been
added as a new component in the construction of Eurasia.
The architect behind this new conception of the Eurasian
space is Vladimir Putin, who promoted the idea of a Eur-
asian Union, a new integration project for the region, in an
article published in the Izvestia newspaper in October 2011.
The principal idea behind this proposal is to build a
powerful supranational association capable of becom-
ing one of the poles in the modern world and serving
as an eﬃcient bridge between Europe and the dynamic
Asia-Paciﬁc region. […] Alongside other key players and
regional structures, such as the European Union, the
United States, China and APEC, the Eurasian Union will
help ensure global sustainable development. (Putin, 2011)
This initiative can also be seen as an attempt by Moscow
to expand the deﬁnition of the geopolitical space of Eurasia
to include an institutional framework. This complements
and further consolidates the historical community in Eurasia
centered on Russia (the Eurasian Economic Union will be
treated in more detail below). This has become a priority
in Putin’s third presidential term, as he made clear in his
inauguration speech:
These coming years will be crucial for shaping Russia’s
future in the decades to come. We must all understand
that the life of our future generations and our pros-
pects as a country and nation depend […] on our
determination in developing our vast expanses from the
Baltic to the Paciﬁc, and on our ability to become a leader
and center of gravity for the whole of Eurasia. (Putin,
2012a)
The evolution of the use of Eurasia in Russian dis-
course reveals some interesting preliminary conclusions.
Over the years, Eurasia moved from being an undeﬁned vast
geopolitical region, of which Russia is a central part, to a
region which is dominated by Russia and in which Russia
increasingly tries to institutionalize its dominance through
a new regional setting. For instance, Putin proposed the es-
tablishment of a Eurasian Union (controlled by Russia) with
the aim to consolidate the actors in the Eurasian region and
to position the region as an important link between the Euro-
Atlantic and the Asia-Paciﬁc regions. Russia considers its
centrality within Eurasia as a precondition for its strong role
in global politics, especially with the recent moves in favor
of establishing Eurasia as a geopolitical region governed by
legitimate institutional links and thus responding to a
broader tendency in global politics toward more institu-
tionalized regionalism and supranational organizations.
4.2. Euro-Atlantic
Traditionally and historically, the Euro-Atlantic region and
especially NATO, the principal security organization within
this area, functioned as a counterpart to Russia and the Soviet
Union. However, with the break-up of the Soviet Empire,
the Euro-Atlantic space slowly acquired a new meaning.
Some countries of the Eastern Bloc, including former Soviet
republics, were admitted as new members to the institu-
tions of this region, above all NATO but also the European
Union (EU). For a long time, Russia remained an outsider.
However, in the early 2000s, a new optic characterizedMos-
cow’s relationships with the EAR, leading to active attempts
3 The three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which are now
members of the EU and NATO, never participated in the CIS, and Georgia
withdrew from the organization in 2008 following the war against Russia.
It is sometimes argued that the CIS is merely an “empty shell” and inef-
ﬁcient as organization. However, it serves an important ideational purpose
with regard to Russian discourses (Delcour, 2011, 35).
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by Russia to shape a new vision of this region. For in-
stance, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized
the need to reformulate the construction of the Euro-
Atlantic space by calling for “new deﬁnition of Atlanticism
that does not exclude Russia” (Lavrov, 2007). Later, Lavrov
reasserted Russia’s position to this effect with reference to
the changed circumstances derived from the dissolution of
the Soviet Union: “Now, with the end of the Cold War, truly
collective decisions are possible in the Euro-Atlantic area,
which are unthinkable without the equal participation of
Russia” (Lavrov, 2008).
While Russia long remained excluded from the politi-
cal and institutional Euro-Atlantic community, Russia’s
leaders continuously stressed Russia’s belonging to the his-
torical and geographical European community. Before the
East-West confrontation that characterized the Cold War,
Russia, in its form as Russian empire, was a part of Europe
and the European concert of powers. According to Putin, this
did not change in the meantime, as he made clear when ad-
dressing the Russian Federal Assembly in 2005: “Above all
else Russia was, is and will, of course, be a major Europe-
an power” (Putin, 2005). Hence, Russia’s construction of the
EAR is closely linked to Russia’s approach to Europe and the
long historical relationship that unites them. As such, Rus-
sia’s Euro-Atlantic policy is an extension of its European
identity. According to the oﬃcial FPC of 2008: “The main
objective of the Russian foreign policy on the European track
is to create a truly open, democratic system of regional col-
lective security and cooperation ensuring the unity of the
Euro-Atlantic region, from Vancouver to Vladivostok”
(Russian Federation, 2008). It is based on its assumed Eu-
ropean identity that Moscow confers meaning upon the
Euro-Atlantic geopolitical space.
Contrary to its position at the center of Eurasia, Russia
cannot claim a similarly dominant role in the Euro-Atlantic
region. The formulation of Russia’s membership in the EAR
rests on a different discourse. Russian debates about the EAR
thus almost exclusively focus on how to form an under-
standing between the dominant forces in the region, as
Lavrov stated in 2007: “It wouldn’t hurt the part of the world
customarily known as the Euro-Atlantic region to have a
triple understanding – between the US, Russia and the Eu-
ropean Union” (Lavrov, 2007). This quote is interesting in
that it reveals Russia’s conception of the EAR as a region
dominated by a handful of powerful actors. It thus seems
that the construction of the Euro-Atlantic community is
based on Moscow’s general reading of global politics as a
system dominated by a small number of great powers each
defending their pragmatic interests. The evolution of this
discourse can also be seen in light of the complicated re-
lationship between Russia and the West. Whereas Russia
sought deeper integration with the West, especially after
9/11, until about 2003/2004 (Iraq war), the continued NATO
enlargement estranged Russia and demonstrated toMoscow
that it had to ﬁnd its place in the EAR outside the bound-
aries of these institutions.
Thus, Russia’s leaders promoted their country as one of
three poles in the Euro-Atlantic power structure and an
active supplier of public goods. This implies a reformula-
tion of Russian discourses around the themes of security
and stability and the construction of the Euro-Atlantic as
a security community. For instance, DmitryMedvedev during
his tenure as President drafted a proposal for a pan-European
security treaty, with the aim to form a more comprehen-
sive security regime for the entire region.4 In so doing,
Russia’s policy-makers shaped their own understanding and
interpretation of the region’s importance. By taking the ini-
tiative, Moscow attempts to dominate the formulation of
the Euro-Atlantic region’s raison d’être and shape a new
discourse:
The Euro-Atlantic vision today needs a positive agenda.
[…] [A new European security treaty] should consoli-
date the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole on the basis of
uniform rules of the game. And it should ensure in stable
and legally binding form our common security guaran-
tees for many years to come. (Medvedev, 2008)
The proposal to establish a new and inclusive security
structure aims at replacing the traditional Euro-Atlantic
structures and organizations such as NATO. Indeed, Lavrov
argues that the main problem with the current system is
“NATO-centrism, which by deﬁnition negates the creation
of a truly universal mechanism of collective security in the
Euro-Atlantic area” (Lavrov, 2008).
This new Russian proposal thus basically was a call to
abandon the existing regional structures which exclude
Russia or to reconstruct the region to include Russia. Hence,
since the end of the Cold War, Moscow’s discourse con-
tinuously evolved in the direction of forming a new
understanding of the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical space which
includes Russia as one of the dominant actors. The pur-
ported shift from outsider to insider went alongside efforts
to appropriate the sovereignty with regard to the deﬁni-
tion of the Euro-Atlantic space.
4.3. Asia-Paciﬁc
In recent years, the Asia-Paciﬁc region (APR) emerged
as one of the major theatres in global politics. In contrast
to the continent of Asia, the Asia-Paciﬁc makes reference
to the global and inclusive nature of the region beyond
purely Asian countries. As such the US is a part of the Asia-
Paciﬁc, as is Russia, despite their lack of an Asian identity.5
Russia, however, can claim that it is Asian by nature of its
geography and the fact that two-thirds of its territory lie
in Asia. Yet, Russia’s historical orientation as a country was
toward the West and Europe. The distinction between Asia
and the Asia-Paciﬁc is crucial and part and parcel of Rus-
sia’s construction of this space. While the term Asia clearly
has strong identity-related and historical connotations, the
term Asia-Paciﬁc has a pragmatic meaning. The APR in
Russian discourse thus primarily refers to issues like eco-
nomic development and security cooperation. In general,
it is interesting to observe the change in tone.
In the 2008 FPC, the Asia-Paciﬁc space is constructed
within the context of Russia’s multi-vector foreign policy
4 The full text of the draft European security treaty is available at
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/275, accessed 26 November 2013.
5 According to Salin, Russia is not considered to be Asian by most Asian
countries. However, it can very well be considered a Paciﬁc nation, just
like the US (Salin, 2012).
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and Russia’s “belonging to this dynamically developing
region of the world” (Russian Federation, 2008). However,
one presidential term and one FPC later, the language
became more assertive. Moscow aﬃrmed its ‘member-
ship’ in the geopolitical space of the Asia-Paciﬁc:
“Strengthening Russia’s presence in the Asia-Paciﬁc region
(APR) is becoming increasingly important since Russia is an
integral part of this fastest-developing geopolitical zone”
(Russian Federation, 2013). Russia attempted to diversify its
foreign and economic relations which thus far were mostly
oriented toward the EAR. In addition, this change in atti-
tude and Russia’s ‘Asia pivot’ is in accordance with the
globally perceived shift of power to the East. In this context,
Russia, still nurturing the ambition to re-establish the cou-
ntry’s status as one of the principal global great powers,
cannot be absent from the Asia-Paciﬁc.
Another aspect of the meaning of the Asia-Paciﬁc for
Russia is related to domestic considerations. Thereby, geo-
graphical proximity is used to establish strong links between
the development of the APR and Russia’s own develop-
ment. The development of Siberia and the Russian Far East
is thus directly related to the economic potential of the
Asia-Paciﬁc:
The Asia-Paciﬁc region is becoming the most dynamic
center of world economic development and our foreign
policy line on deepening relations with APR should be
closely tied up with domestic tasks, with the promo-
tion of potential Russian interests towards using these
ties to further develop the economy of Siberia and the
Far East. (Putin, 2004)
Moscow thus makes clear that the welfare of its eastern
regions is inseparable from the dynamics of the Asia-
Paciﬁc. By extension, the meaning of this geopolitical space
is constructed around this economic and commercial com-
ponent. According to Vladimir Putin,
in the 21st century, the vector of Russia’s development
will be the development of the East. Siberia and the Far
East represent our enormous potential. And nowwemust
realise our potential. We have the opportunity to assume
a worthy place in the Asia-Paciﬁc region, the most
dynamic region in the world. (Putin, 2012b)
Hence, the APR is characterized as a land of opportuni-
ties and “Russia’s integration into the Asian-Paciﬁc economic
space is of utmost importance” (Medvedev, 2010). In ad-
dition to fostering the development of the Russian Far East,
the security predicament plays an important role, since
peace and stability in the region are equally needed to
provide a fertile environment in which economic cooper-
ation may take place.
Over the years, Russia has evolved from being a passive
member of the APR to an active participant. The discourse
of Russia’s leaders put more emphasis on Russia’s mem-
bership in the Asia-Paciﬁc space and not merely the
aﬃrmation of pragmatic interests. This also means that Rus-
sia’s role is characterized differently; Russia no longer purely
beneﬁts from the Asia-Paciﬁc’s dynamism for its own de-
velopment, but it actively contributes to it.
In accordance with the ‘rise of the East’, Russia ad-
justed its policy and interests. Through discourse, Russia’s
belonging to the region and participation in regional matters
is justiﬁed. However, this justiﬁcation is based on a geo-
graphical reading and Russia’s contiguity with the APR. This
demonstrates that Russian interests in the APR are of a prag-
matic nature in terms of keeping its position as a great
power. It is in this context that we have to understand
Russian efforts to integrate regional organization in the APR,
such as ASEAN and APEC, whose summit Russia hosted for
the ﬁrst time in 2012 in Vladivostok.
5. The impact of the Ukraine crisis
Vladimir Putin returned to the Russian presidency for
a third term in 2012.With regard to foreign policy, twomajor
issues can be highlighted: the Ukraine Crisis and annex-
ation of Crimea and the establishment of the Eurasian
Economic Union (EEU). While these two issues evolved in
parallel, there is a signiﬁcant overlap in terms of their geo-
political implications. The EEU project was already in the
pipeline well before the Ukraine crisis; however, the idea
of a wider Eurasian integration reached a new quality fol-
lowing the events in Ukraine. In general, the Ukraine crisis
and its repercussions for Russia’s relations with the West,
have an impact on Russia’s geopolitical vision. The follow-
ing section will analyze this in more detail.
While the idea of the EEU had been in the pipeline since
Putin ﬁrst outlined it in his Izvestia article in 2011, the agree-
ment between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan for its
implementation was signed on 29 May 2014. Armenia
decided to become a member on 9 October and the EEU
ﬁnally came into effect on 1 January 2015.6 In the mean-
time, the Ukraine crisis was in full swing. The crisis started
in November 2013, when the Ukrainian President Victor
Yanukovych suddenly withdrew from the planned signing
of an association agreement with the EU. Since then, events
unfolded quickly, with the ousting of the Yanukovych gov-
ernment, the annexation of Crimea by Russia,7 the election
of a new government under the leadership of President Petro
Poroshenko, the formation of pro-Russian groups that took
to arms in Eastern Ukraine leading to the establishment of
the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics and the in-
creasingly brutal and large-scale military ﬁghting between
the Ukrainian military and the Russian-backed separatist
ﬁghters (Wilson, 2014). Attempts at conﬂict resolution so
far failed. The conﬂict parties, under mediation from the
6 See Popescu (2014) for a detailed discussion of the Eurasian Union
project.
7 Russia does not agree with labeling this an annexation, but insists on
referring to the right of self-determination as enshrined in international
law. In an interview with Western media, Putin replied to a question
whether Russian troops annexed Crimea as follows: “It’s a delusion that
Russian troops annexed Crimea”. He went on to state that Crimea joining
the Russia Federationwas compliant with international law: “Russian troops
were in Crimea under the international treaty on the deployment of the
Russian military base. It’s true that Russian troops helped Crimeans hold
a referendum on their (a) independence and (b) desire to join the Russian
Federation. No one can prevent these people from exercising a right that
is stipulated in Article 1 of the UN Charter, the right of nations to self-
determination” (Putin, 2014b). However, Allison argues that this
argumentation and Russia’s legal rhetoric with regard to its actions in
Crimea, and Ukraine in general, are seriously ﬂawed (Allison, 2014,
1258–1268).
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OSCE, signed the Minsk Protocol in September 2014 with
the aim to establish a ceaseﬁre. After the ceaseﬁre broke
down only months later, a second agreement, ‘Minsk II’,
aiming to revive the previous one, was brokered in Febru-
ary 2015 by leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany.
Nevertheless, ﬁghting between the Ukrainian army and the
separatists in the East continues to this day. So far, the UN
estimates that more than 6500 people died during the con-
ﬂict andmore than 1,300,000 have been internally displaced
and over 900,000 people sought asylum in neighboring
countries (United Nations Oﬃce for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, 2015). However, resolution of the con-
ﬂict still seems to be far away. As a result of the crisis and
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine (above all the annexation
of Crimea), the EU and US applied sanctions against a list
of Russian individuals, oﬃcials and businesses, to which
Moscow replied with countersanctions blocking agricul-
tural imports from these countries.8 The conﬂict thus
attained a global level with far-reaching repercussions. In
the following part, this article will reﬂect upon the impli-
cations of these events for the traditional geopolitical outlook
in Russian foreign policy.
5.1. The geopolitical conditions of the Ukraine crisis
Many observers in Europe have asked how we arrived
at the situation of war in Europe again, after what seemed
to be a peaceful end of the Cold War. For many, the prin-
cipal cause of the Ukraine crisis is to be found in geopolitics.
Be it Russia’s quest to control the territory beyond its borders
(its ‘near abroad’) or the perceived competition between the
EU and Russia over the countries in Europe’s East and
between Russia and the US globally. According to Sakwa,
a number of issues have created the conditions leading to
the Ukraine crisis: “The persistent delegitimation of Rus-
sia’s security concerns, the anti-Russianism of the newNATO
members, the failure to overcome the asymmetries in the
Cold War settlement, the consolidation of a monological
Wider European agenda of EU enlargement and its effec-
tive merger with the Atlantic security system, and the
dismissal of Russian and other ideas for Greater European
unity” (Sakwa, 2015, p. 48). From this debatable view-
point, Moscow’s actions in Ukraine were thus reactive rather
than proactive. With regard to the geopolitical imagina-
tion outlined above, two issues are particularly important.
First, NATO enlargement and, second, competition between
Russia and the EU over diverging views of how Europe
should be organized. As Putin argued in his speech in Sev-
astopol, following the annexation of Crimea, the West’s
actions in Ukraine, already before the crisis (such as the color
revolutions and NATOmembership promise to Georgia and
Ukraine) were offensive: “We understand what is happen-
ing; we understand that these actions were aimed against
Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. And
all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our
colleagues in the West” (Putin, 2014a).
The relationship between Russia and NATO is a compli-
cated one. Russia’s negative perceptions of NATO
enlargement, with the accession of former Warsaw pact
members and Soviet republics to the alliance, played a role
in the way in which Russia’s geopolitical imagination de-
veloped and also inﬂuenced Moscow’s actions in Ukraine.
As the realist scholar Mearsheimer argued, NATO enlarge-
ment is “the taproot of the trouble” and the Ukraine crisis
thus theWest’s fault (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 77). At the NATO
summit in Bucharest in 2008, Ukraine (and Georgia) were
promised NATO membership in the future. While neither
of the two countries was offered a Membership Action Plan,
the formal step toward NATO accession, Moscow saw this
as a step too far and was determined to prevent such a pos-
sibility. The ﬁve-day war Russia fought in August 2008 with
Georgia can be seen in this light. It was Moscow’s attempt
tomake sure that Georgia will not be able to become a NATO
member in the near future (Dyomkin, 2011). With this in
mind, Putin’s statement during the speech in Sevastopol,
celebrating the integration of Crimea into Russia, speaks
clearly:
Let me note too that we have already heard declara-
tions from Kiev about Ukraine soon joining NATO. What
would this have meant for Crimea and Sevastopol in the
future? It would have meant that NATO’s navy would be
right there in this city of Russia’s military glory, and this
would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat
to the whole of southern Russia. (Putin, 2014a)
Hence, as Sakwa argues, while NATO enlargement was
considered (by both existing and new members) to be the
condition for a peaceful and united Europe, it left Russia
outside and treated it like a loser of the ColdWar. However,
when Russia became more powerful again and aﬃrmed its
status as part of the European security architecture, the clash
with NATO was unavoidable (Sakwa, 2015, p. 46).9 The geo-
political logic underlying the Ukraine crisis, however, goes
one step further because it not only involved NATO en-
largement, but also the general European security
architecture and contradicting visions of Europe’s
development.
For years, Russia promoted the idea of a ‘Greater Europe’,
a space ranging from the Atlantic to the Paciﬁc coast – from
Lisbon to Vladivostok – as a new form of cooperation
between Russia and the EU and deeper integration on the
continent (Menkiszak, 2013). However, this idea fell on deaf
ears since the EU was pursuing its own idea of a ‘Wider
Europe’. As a result, these two visions increasingly clashed
with each other (Sakwa, 2015, p. 26). Indeed, as also others
have argued, the EU and its attempts to draw the former
8 For three recent book-length studies of the Ukraine crisis, see Wilson
(2014), Menon and Rumer (2015), Sakwa (2015). For a complete chrono-
logical overview see the website ‘The Ukraine Crisis Timeline’ by the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), available at
http://csis.org/ukraine/index.htm (last accessed on 28 June 2015).
9 Putin’s statement when speaking to students in St. Petersburg illus-
trates this point neatly: “who is doing the ﬁghting [in Ukraine] in reality?
[…] a substantial part of those doing the ﬁghting come from the so-
called volunteer nationalist battalions. Essentially, this is not an army but
is a foreign legion, in this particular case, a NATO foreign legion, which is
not pursuing Ukraine’s national interests of course. They have com-
pletely different goals, related to achieving their geopolitical aim of
containing Russia” (Putin, 2015a).
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Soviet republics closer to its orbit were looked upon by
Moscowwith increasing suspicion (Götz, 2015, p. 4). Foreign
Minister Lavrov made this very clear in his speech at the
Munich Security Forum in 2015:
There is a pinnacle in the course pursued by our western
colleagues in the past quarter of a century on preserv-
ing their domination in world affairs by all possible
means, on seizing the geopolitical space in Europe. They
demanded of the CIS countries – our closest neighbours,
connected with us by centuries economically, histori-
cally, culturally and even in terms of family ties – that
they make a choice: “either with theWest, or against the
West.” […] The EU chose a path of confrontation over
the development of mutually beneﬁcial interaction
mechanisms. (Lavrov, 2015a)
The principal initiative developed by EU to engage some
of the former Soviet republics was the Eastern Partner-
ship. Developed in 2009, this program was considered by
Russia to be an infringement of its sphere of inﬂuence and
an attempt to draw its neighbors away fromMoscow. Hence,
when Russia started to formulate its Eurasian integration
project and implemented the EEU, a geopolitical confron-
tation with the EU began (Sakwa, 2015, p. 41). This is
relevant for our discussion of the Ukraine crisis and is echoed
in a statement by Foreign Minister Lavrov:
The EU Eastern Partnership programme was also de-
signed to expand theWest-controlled geopolitical space
to the east. […] There is a policy to confront the CIS coun-
tries with a hard, absolutely contrived and artiﬁcial choice
– either you are with the EU or with Russia. It was the
use of this approach to Ukraine that pushed that country
[…] to a profound internal political crisis. (Lavrov, 2014c)
Russia thus increasingly saw the EU’s initiatives in the
countries of the former Soviet Union as both a threat to its
national interests and to its security. It singlehandedly
blamed theWest, and above all the EU, for pushing the limits
too far and for engaging in geopolitical competition, ulti-
mately leading to the crisis in Ukraine. At the same time,
Götz argues that Russia exhibited a similar behavior in that
it “is engaged in a geopolitical offensive, extending beyond
Ukraine, with the aim to promote or consolidate its region-
al primacy” (Götz, 2015, p. 8). Hence, NATO enlargement
and the exclusive European security system, which was re-
jected by Russia, were major causes for the outbreak of the
Ukraine crisis. The trigger, however, was the planned signing
of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine
at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November
2013 (Walker, 2015).
5.2. Failed integration into the Euro-Atlantic space
The crisis in Ukraine accentuated Russia’s perception of
the West and the increasingly negative view of the EAR. As
a result, Russian foreign policy discourse on the EAR evolved
signiﬁcantly. While Russia previously spoke of the West –
the EU and US in particular – as partners, it now lambasts
them for excluding Russia. The current crisis in Ukraine and
the powerfulWestern reactionwith economic sanctions have
demonstrated to Russia that the US and the EU are willing
to shut Russia out from the multipolar world order and
instead aim to maintain the unipolar order under US lead-
ership. As Lavrov stated during his speech at the UN general
assembly:
The situation there has revealed the remaining deep-
rooted systemic ﬂaws of the existing architecture in the
Euro-Atlantic area. TheWest has embarked upon a course
towards “the vertical structuring of humanity” tailored
to its own hardly inoffensive standards. After they de-
clared victory in the Cold War and the “end of history,”
the US and the EU opted for expanding the geopolitical
area under their control without taking into account the
balance of legitimate interests of all the people of Europe.
(Lavrov, 2014b)
While Russia was seeking cooperative relations, its
“western partners have promoted their own agenda, ignor-
ing Russia’s interests in many points, expanded NATO, and
generally attempted to move the geopolitical space under
their control directly to the Russian borders” (Lavrov, 2014a).
Permeating these statements is a clear understanding that
this is a result of US policies and that the EU actually only
follows the US’ lead. Hence, Russia ﬁnds itself in competi-
tion with the US over Europe, which traditionally is one of
Russia’s main partners. This has been expressed clearly in
a number of statements: “Regarding the Ukraine crisis, the
US goal is to prevent Russia and the EU from deepening their
partnership. […] I have no doubts whatsoever that this is
its strategic goal” (Lavrov, 2015b). This is an important point
since it demonstrates that Russia’s discourse is more
nuanced when it comes to the EU. For instance, the follow-
ing statement by Lavrov indicated that Russia sees the United
States as its primary adversary and the EU still as a partner:
The course to restriction of Russia’s possibilities is led
not by European powers, but by the United States. Many
analysts in Russia, the European Union and in the United
States underline that the United States do not want to
allow the potentials of Russia and the EU to combine,
guided primarily by the objective of keeping their global
leadership. (Lavrov, 2014a)
The discourse with regard to the Euro-Atlantic space thus
took a new turn. In this regard, the competition over Ukraine
became a competition over Russia’s place in Europe. As
Lavrov argued, “the United States is interested not in the
peaceful settlement of the conﬂict in Ukraine, but in using
this country as an irritant in the relations between Russia
and Europe and as an excuse to put Russia in its place”
(Lavrov, 2014c). Not only does this statement allude to Rus-
sia’s interest in maintaining cooperative relations with
Europe, it also demonstrates that Ukraine acts as an im-
portant means through which Russia remains inﬂuential in
Europe.
In the end, the result of Russia’s engagement with the
EAR was failed integration. The crisis over Ukraine is just
the ﬁnal nail in the coﬃn of Russia’s attempt to become a
full-ﬂedged member of the Euro-Atlantic space. However,
the statements above indicate an important distinction. Even
though Russia currently considers the EU a geopolitical ad-
versary when it comes to the post-Soviet space, the logic
of a cooperative relationship has not yet been abandoned.
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The discussion below will demonstrate that Russia has not
yet fully abandoned its idea of ‘Greater Europe’ – “a common
space for economic and humanitarian cooperation that
would spread from the Atlantic Ocean to the Paciﬁc Ocean
– […] a single space from Lisbon to Vladivostok” (Putin,
2014c). In addition, Moscow’s discourse on Eurasian inte-
gration has become more varied.
5.3. The new dimension of Eurasian integration
This brings us to the Eurasian Economic Union. There are
two dimensions to this project. First, while integration pro-
cesses in the post-Soviet space have existed before, it
demonstrates the importance of Russia’s “pivot to Eurasia”
as a major characteristic of Putin’s third presidency (Liik,
2014). Second, the EEU has always been framed as a coop-
erative project that could one day lead to closer integration
within what Russia sees as ‘Greater Europe’. Indeed, when
it comes to the EEU, Russia’s leaders put a strong empha-
sis on the open nature of the project:
As we promote the Eurasian integration project, we are
in no way trying to separate ourselves from the rest of
the world; we are ready to consider prospects for cre-
ating free trade zones both with individual states and
with regional associations and unions, primarily the Eu-
ropean Union, of course. (Putin, 2014c)
This insistence on cooperation with the EU is very strong
and while Putin laments the fact that the EU refuses to ac-
knowledge the EEU and enter into cooperation with it, he
does not tire to claim that the EEU and the EU should even-
tually work together closely. Here, the idea of Greater Europe
comes back into play since, ideally, cooperation between the
EU and EEU would lead to its realization. Even amidst the
crisis in Ukraine, in October 2014, Foreign Minister Lavrov
reiterated this aim:
We still believe that the strategic goal of Russia-EU co-
operation should be gradual development of a common
economic and cultural space from the Atlantic to the
Paciﬁc Coast based on a system of indivisible security
where no country would strengthen its security at the
expense of the others. We stand for developing coop-
eration between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union
(EAEU) […]. In other words, we stand for a conver-
gence of integration processes. (Lavrov, 2014c)
The essence of this idea should eventually lead to what
Lavrov calls “the integration of integrations” (Lavrov, 2014d),
a convergence of European and Eurasian integration proj-
ects. However, and contrary to what the Russian leadership
hoped for, this logic of cooperation was not implemented.
Instead, it led to what Charap and Troitskiy call the “inte-
gration dilemma” in which “one state perceives as a threat
to its own security or prosperity its neighbours’ integra-
tion into military alliances or economic groupings that are
closed to it” (Charap & Troitskiy, 2013, p. 50). As a result
of this integration dilemma, which played out in the Ukraine
crisis, the idea of a Greater Europe, uniting Russia with the
EU, is no longer plausible. The relationship between Russia
and theWest remained fraught with competitionwhich took
serious economic (sanctions) and discursive (propaganda
war) turns. As a result, fostering the development of the EEU
became the new strategic goal, which would help over-
come Russia’s isolated position within Europe and the EAR.
Russian discourse evolved, leading to the EEU being de-
picted as one of the foundations for a strong Russia in global
politics, because it gives Russia more importance vis-à-vis
its neighbors in the West (EU) but also in the East (Trenin,
2014, pp. 9–10). In the light of the Ukraine crisis, the fol-
lowing statement which Putin made during the 2013 Valdai
discussion club meeting seems to be relevant today:
The Eurasian Union is a project for maintaining the iden-
tity of nations in the historical Eurasian space in a new
century and in a new world. Eurasian integration is a
chance for the entire post-Soviet space to become an in-
dependent centre for global development, rather than
remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia. (Putin,
2013)
Coming back to the earlier question of how Russia’s geo-
political outlook changed due to the implementation of the
EEU and the events in Ukraine, we can observe that Eurasia
remained at the center of Russian foreign policy. However,
the institutionalization of Eurasian integration with the im-
plementation of the EEU and Russian attempts to attract new
members, added a new dimension. As the locomotive of its
own Eurasian integration project, Russia cemented its place
as a pole in the multipolar order.
Since Russia’s leaders continuously emphasized the open
nature of the EEU project, its implementation did not lead
to an estrangement between Russia and the APR. Similar-
ly, the negative repercussions of the Ukraine crisis seemed
to be conﬁned to the EAR and Europe. However, this is not
to say that it did not have an impact. On the contrary, as
the following statement from Lavrov indicates, the Ukraine
crisis, and the subsequent sanctions imposed on Russia by
the US and the EU, helped Russia foster closer ties with the
APR: “the recent restrictive measures have provided an
impetus formore actively developing relationswith our part-
ners in the East, although we would rather do this
simultaneously with developing our traditional coopera-
tion with the West than instead of it” (Lavrov, 2014c). The
emphasis on the potential of the SCO, which is seen as a
tool that could help Russia develop stronger ties with its
eastern neighbors, wasmore prominent. In addition, the SCO
of course also provides important links to China, which
became a strong partner for Russia, a development that was
reinforced by the events in and around Ukraine.
Hence, in May 2014, Russia signed a $400 billion gas deal
with China that would supply the latter with Russian gas
over 30 years. While this deal had important symbolic value,
the actual economic value remains contested, since the price
China is paying is below the price in Europe. Neverthe-
less, Russia and China have been moving closer amid the
crisis with the West. On the eve of Russia’s Victory Day cel-
ebrations on 8 May, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping and
Vladimir Putin signed a number of bilateral agreements.
Chief among them was a joint declaration on cooperation
in coordinating the development of the Eurasian Econom-
ic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt. Using very similar
language as in previous statements about the potential for
the EEU to integrate with the EU, Putin stated the goal of
137D. Svarin / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 129–140
this new cooperation with the Chinese project as follows:
“Essentially, we seek ultimately to reach a new level of part-
nership that will create a common economic space across
the entire Eurasian continent” (Putin, 2015b).
Hence, in addition of being an important partner for
Russia in the SCO, as well as a fellow great power in themul-
tipolar world order, Russia and China now seemed to have
elevated their relations to the next level. This also demon-
strates Russia’s willingness to adapt its geopolitical outlook.
In so doing, its new integration project, the EEU, was
rebranded as a means to foster stronger ties with the SCO
and the APR in general. The logic thus changed: while pre-
viously the emphasis of the EEU was on cooperation with
the EU, eventually leading to ‘Greater Europe’, the EEU now
stands for the development of the entire Eurasian region.
As Trenin pointedly puts it, “in lieu of a Greater Europe from
Lisbon to Vladivostok, a Greater Asia from Shanghai to St.
Petersburg is in the making” (Trenin, 2015, p. 11).
6. Conclusion
Traditionally, Russia sees itself as a member of three geo-
political spaces: Eurasia, the Euro-Atlantic and the Asia-
Paciﬁc. Russia’s political leaders perceive Russia to havemore
than one, or at least a ﬂexible identity. Each of these spaces
carries several attributes and characterizations and occu-
pies a particular role in Russia’s perception of its own
position in global affairs. The brief discussion about the im-
portance of status considerations in Russian foreign policy
has demonstrated that Russia strives to be recognized as a
great power. Russian membership in the three geopoliti-
cal spaces has a dialectical importance with regard to this
Great Power status. Because Russia is a “member” of each
of these regions it is a great power and as a great power, it
is automatically part or has interests in each of these regions.
Furthermore, Russian membership in these geopolitical
spaces is at the same time instrumental to Moscow’s foreign
policy with regard to its quest for great power status as well
as constitutive with regard to Russia’s geopolitical outlook
and the perception of its place in the international system.
After a preliminary analysis of the implications of the
Ukraine crisis, it can be concluded that Russia’s geopoliti-
cal vision experienced a considerable shift. Before the
Ukraine crisis, Russia considered itself to be a “full member”
of the three geopolitical spaces Eurasia, Euro-Atlantic and
Asia-Paciﬁc. The events in Ukraine, which unfolded through-
out the year 2014 and are still ongoing, as well as their
global repercussions, had an impact on Russian geopoliti-
cal thinking. From the point of view of the Russian
leadership, the Ukraine crisis demonstrated that Moscow
cannot be part of the EAR in its current form. The sense of
rejection and the failed attempts at integration were too
heavy a burden. Russia’s leaders consider their country to
be one of the main powers in a multipolar international
system and refuse to be pushed outside of this system. The
Ukraine crisis brought to light that the traditional and
decades-long rivalry with the US is still simmeringand the
relationship between the US and Russia is in deadlock. Rus-
sia’s membership in the Euro-Atlantic space thus more and
more resembled a farce.
This sentiment of rejection and exclusion, coupled with
the Ukraine crisis, went hand in handwith Russia’s new Eur-
asian discourse and the expansion of Eurasian integration.
Hence, Russia’s focus on Eurasia, which represents Rus-
sia’s “traditional position as a Eurasian power sitting between
the East and the West” and the turn to the East and China
becamemore important (Trenin, 2015, p. 3). This led toMos-
cow’s departure from its previous stance of wanting to be
an equalmember of the EAR. Indeed, while Russia still strives
for Great Power status, Moscow no longer feels the need
to be a member of each of the three geopolitical spaces.
Instead, it needs its own integration project, ideally with
global reach, which explains the stark focus on the Eur-
asian Economic Union. What is more, the turn to the East
and to China in particular, provided the EEU with a new di-
mension for development. As such it can be argued that
Russia’s vision of Eurasia experience a slight shift from
‘EURasia’ to ‘eurASIA’.
The discussion and the main arguments in Russia’s con-
struction of the three geopolitical spaces, as well as the
impact of the Ukraine crisis on this traditional thinking are
summarized in Table 1.
Discourses by political leaders in the realm of foreign
policy fulﬁll a particular function of communicating the cou-
ntry’s interests and priorities, while at the same time
detailing the elite’s worldview. They also serve to justify
certain policies and to position the country on the global
political map according to the policy-makers’ perception of
that map. As such, discourses reﬂect the perceived role of
a country in international affairs. Russia’s place in the in-
ternational order has signiﬁcantly changed, not only due to
its actions in Ukraine, but also due to its discursive prac-
tice of carving out a new place for the country. This article
has demonstrated that Russia’s elite actively formulated their
country’s central position in the three ‘geopolitical spaces’
up until the Ukraine crisis. Thereafter, Moscow continued
to claim a dominant role in current international affairs,
while its regional geopolitical outlook becomemore focused
on Eurasia and the potential of the EEU as an integrator with
other organizations and countries.
The question of the long-term implications of the
Ukraine crisis on Russia’s geopolitical imagination remains.
Equally, drawing conclusions on what needs to be done
for the restoration of constructive relations between Brus-
sels, Moscow and Washington remains diﬃcult. However,
in light of the previous discussion, not all hope is lost.
Russia’s turn to the East, while providing many opportu-
nities and beneﬁts, does not represent a complete rejection
of relations with the West. Both in terms of economic
cooperation as well as historical and cultural links, Russia
is bound to interact with the US and the EU. This is also
reﬂected in a large number of discourses by Russia’s
leaders. What is more, Russia consistently stressed that
the EEU is an open project with the aim to integrate the
wider Eurasian region and to create a common space
encompassing the entire continent. This offer still stands.
If both conﬂict parties manage to rebuild some of the lost
trust and to break out of the logic of zero-sum competi-
tion, stronger links between the different integrationmodels
could eventually lead to a better common understanding
and a new logic of cooperation.
138 D. Svarin / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 129–140
Acknowledgments
Earlier versions of this article have been presented at the
ISA annual convention in Toronto in March 2014 and at the
International Relations Research Seminar Series at Bilkent
University in February 2015. The author would like to thank
Tim Dunne, Jarrod Hayes, Onur Isci, the seminar partici-
pants as well as the anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments and feedback. The author would like to acknowl-
edge ﬁnancial support from the Swiss National Science
Foundation (P1SKP1_158726).
References
Agnew, J. (2003). Geopolitics: Re-visioning world politics (2nd ed.). London
and New York: Routledge.
Agnew, J., & Corbridge, S. (1995). Mastering space: Hegemony, territory and
international political economy. London and New York: Routledge.
Allison, R. (2014). Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: How and why
Russia broke the rules. International Affairs, 90(6), 1255–1297.
Ambrosio, T., & Vandrovec, G. (2013). Mapping the geopolitics of the
Russian Federation: The Federal Assembly Addresses of Putin and
Medvedev. Geopolitics, 18(2), 435–466.
Bassin, M. (2004). The two faces of contemporary geopolitics. Progress in
Human Geography, 28(5), 620–626.
Campbell, D. (1992). Writing security: United States foreign policy and the
politics of identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Charap, S., & Troitskiy, M. (2013). Russia, the west and the integration
dilemma. Survival, 55(6), 49–62.
Clunan, A. (2009). The social construction of Russia’s resurgence: Aspirations,
identity, and security interests. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Dalby, S. (1991). Critical geopolitics: Discourse, difference, and dissent.
Environment and Planning. D, Society and Space, 9(3), 261–283.
Delcour, L. (2011). Shaping the post-Soviet space? EU policies and approaches
to region-building. Farnham: Ashgate.
Dijkink, G. (1996). National identity and geopolitical visions: Maps of pride
and pain. London: Routledge.
Dodds, K. (1993). Geopolitics, experts and the making of foreign policy.
Area, 25(1), 70–74.
Dodds, K. (2001). Political geography III: Critical geopolitics after ten years.
Progress in Human Geography, 25(3), 469–484.
Dyomkin, D. (2011). Russia says Georgia war stopped NATO expansion.
Reuters. <http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/idINIndia-6064572
0111121> Accessed 12.01.15.
Götz, E. (2015). It’s geopolitics, stupid: Explaining Russia’s Ukraine policy.
Global Affairs, 1(1), 3–10.
Hopf, T. (2002). Social construction of international politics: Identities and
foreign policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Ivanov, S. (2001). Speech at the 37th Munich conference on security policy.
<http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Russia/Ivanov-Sergey/Text
-of-speech-given-by-Russian-Security-Council-Secretary-Sergei
-Ivanov-at-the-37th-Munich-Conference-on-Security-Policy-on-
February-4-2001> Accessed 03.06.13.
Ivanov, S. (2004). Speech at the 40th Munich conference on security policy.
<http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Europe-NATO-Russia/
Ivanov-Sergey/Speech-by-Sergey-B.-Ivanov-at-the-40th-Munich
-Conference-on-Security-Policy> Accessed 03.06.13.
Kuus, M. (2010). Critical geopolitics. In R. Denemark (Ed.), The International
Studies Encyclopedia (pp. 683–701). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Lavrov, S. (2007). Speech at MGIMO. <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/
brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/2c11d9a5d7a4
d595c325734c001c31d9!OpenDocument> Accessed 03.06.13.
Lavrov, S. (2008). Speech at MGIMO. <http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/23bf63
3dde5f5658c32571f80049df94/d2ca87d862a0db6dc32574b9001
d9be5?OpenDocument> Accessed 03.06.13.
Lavrov, S. (2014a). Speech at the meeting with members of the Russian
International Affairs Council. <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/
e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/f772add4c6b7e1774425
7cef005c7a2c!OpenDocument> Accessed 12.01.15.
Lavrov, S. (2014b). Address to the 69th session of the UN General Assembly.
<http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b432569990
05bcbb3/cdea7854ff002b5a44257d62004f7236!OpenDocument>
Accessed 12.01.15.
Lavrov, S. (2014c). Remarks during an open lecture on Russia’s current
foreign policy. <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f12
8a7b43256999005bcbb3/28bf39a9dfd8dde544257d77005cce7b!
OpenDocument> Accessed 12.01.15.
Lavrov, S. (2014d). Remarks at the XXII assembly of the council on foreign
and defence policy. <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f
128a7b43256999005bcbb3/24454a08d48f695ec3257d9a004ba3
2e!OpenDocument> Accessed 12.01.15.
Lavrov, S. (2015a). Speech at the 51st Munich security conference.
<http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b4325699900
5bcbb3/4e7cddd252fdef1f43257de60031e493!OpenDocument>
Accessed 25.05.
Table 1
Russia’s construction of geopolitical spaces and the impact of the Ukraine crisis.
Eurasia Euro-Atlantic Asia-Paciﬁc
Issues Historical community; economic, political
and institutional integration; regional
stability under Russian leadership and
dominance
End to East–West conﬂict; common
economic space and security architecture
under joint Russian, EU and US leadership;
Economic potential and dynamism;
development and modernization of Siberia
and Russian Far East, security; relations
with China
Discourse Eurasia does not exist without Russia
because Russia is linked politically,
geographically, culturally, economically
and historically with Eurasia
Russia always was a European power with a
European identity (among others) engaged
in European affairs and thus is a part of the
Euro-Atlantic
Russia is part of Asia because two-thirds of
its territory lie there and it has a Paciﬁc
coast, mutually beneﬁcial economic
relations
Evolution Early 2000s: further integration with CIS to
guarantee security.
2007 onward: establishment of new
institutional links, i.e. Customs Union,
EurAsEC; increasing pressure on
neighboring countries.
2011 onward: promotion of the Eurasian
Union; new quality of Eurasian integration
Early 2000s: Discourse focused on Europe
and European identity; cooperation with US.
2007 onwards: proposal of common security
architecture in the EAR through pan-
European security treaty from Vancouver to
Vladivostok.
2011 onward: common economic and
humanitarian space from Lisbon to
Vladivostok
Early 2000s: geographical proximity with
Asia has beneﬁts for Russia and
development of Russian Far East.
2008 onward: Russia as integral part of the
APR with security and economy main
themes; focus on integration with regional
organizations.
2011 onward: Russia and EEU as link
between East and West
Impact of
Ukraine
Crisis
Eurasia is the center of Russian attention;
Economic integration is key, and the EEU
plays a crucial role, especially in Russia’s
quest for great power status; EEU should
foster cooperation with other integration
initiatives; EEU is considered a large-scale
integration project, helping Russia to
integrate with Asia following its
“rejection” by the West.
EAR in its previous form no longer exists;
the US and the West are striving for
unipolarity, while EU/Europe is just a puppet
of US interests; Russia’s attempt at
integration failed; EAR increasingly as a
zone of competition between Russia and the
West, and the EU and EEU; Logic of
competition prevails, yet Russia remains
open to cooperation with West.
Stronger cooperation with APR and China
in particular is important for trade and for
balancing the multipolar system; Russia
strives for deeper integration through the
EEU; SCO remains important in
consolidating APR and increasing
economic and security cooperation.
139D. Svarin / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 129–140
Lavrov, S. (2015b). Interview with Sputnik, Ekho Moskvy and Govorit
Moskva. <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b4
3256999005bcbb3/0bca9a90832725fc43257e3000210820!Open
Document> Accessed 25.05.
Legvold, R. (1989). The revolution in Soviet foreign policy. Foreign Affairs,
68(1), 82–98.
Liik, K. (Ed.), (2014). Russia’s “pivot” to Eurasia. London: ECFR.
Mamadouh, V., & Dijkink, G. (2006). Geopolitics, international relations and
political geography: The politics of geopolitical discourse. Geopolitics,
11(3), 349–366.
Mandelbaum, M. (1998). Introduction: Russian foreign policy in historical
perspective. In M. Mandelbaum (Ed.), The new Russian foreign policy
(pp. 1–22). New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
Mankoff, J. (2009). Russian foreign policy: The return of great power politics.
Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine crisis is the west’s fault: The
liberal delusion that provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), 77–89.
Medvedev, D. (2008). Speech at world policy conference. <http://en
.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/48308> Accessed 19.11.13.
Medvedev, D. (2010). Annual address to the federal assembly.
<http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/1384> Accessed 19.04.13.
Menkiszak, M. (2013). Greater Europe: Putin’s vision of European
(Dis)integration. OSW Studies No. 46. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern
Studies.
Menon, R., & Rumer, E. (2015). Conﬂict in Ukraine: The unwinding of the
Post-Cold War order. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Müller, M. (2008). Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the ﬁeld of
critical geopolitics: Towards discourse as language and practice. Political
Geography, 27(3), 322–338.
O Tuathail, G. (1996). Critical geopolitics: The politics of writing global space.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
O Tuathail, G. (2002). Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: The case
of the United States’ response to the war in Bosnia. Political Geography,
21(5), 601–628.
O Tuathail, G., & Agnew, J. (1992). Geopolitics and discourse: Practical
geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy. Political Geography,
11(2), 190–204.
O’Loughlin, J., O’Tuathail, G., & Kolossov, V. (2006). The geopolitical
orientations of ordinary Russians: A public opinion analysis. Eurasian
Geography and Economics, 47(2), 129–152.
O’Loughlin, J., & Talbot, P. F. (2005). Where in the world is Russia?
Geopolitical perceptions and preferences of ordinary Russians. Eurasian
Geography and Economics, 46(1), 23–50.
Popescu, N. (2014). Eurasian union: The real, the imaginary and the likely.
Chaillot Paper 132. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
Putin, V. (2002). Speech to a conference attended by the heads of Russian
diplomatic missions abroad. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
transcripts/21674> Accessed 19.04.13.
Putin, V. (2003). Annual address to the Federal Assembly. <http://en.kremlin
.ru/events/president/news/28640> Accessed 03.06.13.
Putin, V. (2004). Speech at a plenary session of the Russian Federation
Ambassadors and permanent representatives meeting. <http://en
.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22545> Accessed 19.04.13.
Putin, V. (2005). Annual address to the Federal Assembly. <http://en
.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931> Accessed 03.06.13.
Putin, V. (2007). Speech at the 43th Munich conference on security policy.
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034> Accessed
19.04.13.
Putin, V. (2011). A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the
making. Izvestia, 3 October 2011. <http://www.russianmission.eu/en/
news/article-prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-
project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3-> Accessed 11.03.13.
Putin, V. (2012a). Speech at inauguration as president of Russia.
<http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/3749> Accessed 29.01.14.
Putin, V. (2012b). Annual address to the Federal Assembly. <http://eng
.kremlin.ru/transcripts/4739> Accessed 19.04.13.
Putin, V. (2013). Meeting of the Valdai international discussion club.
<http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6007> Accessed 12.01.15.
Putin, V. (2014a). Address by the president of the Russian Federation in
Sevastopol, Crimea Republic. <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6889>
Accessed 12.01.
Putin, V. (2014b). Interview with Radio Europe 1 and TF1 TV Channel.
<http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/22441> Accessed 12.01.15.
Putin, V. (2014c). Conference of Russian ambassadors and permanent
representatives. <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/22586> Accessed
12.01.15.
Putin, V. (2015a). Meeting with students at the Mining University.
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47519> Accessed 25.05.15.
Putin, V. (2015b). Press statements following Russian-Chinese talks.
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49433> Accessed
25.05.15.
Rumer, E. B. (2007). Russian foreign policy beyond Putin. London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Russian Federation. (2000). The foreign policy concept of the Russian
Federation 2000. <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/
econcept.htm> Accessed 18.04.13.
Russian Federation. (2008). The foreign policy concept of the Russian
Federation 2008. <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116> Accessed
18.04.13.
Russian Federation. (2013). Concept of the foreign policy of the Russian
Federation 2013. <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f
128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16
d!OpenDocument> Accessed 18.04.13.
Sakwa, R. (2015). Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the borderlands. London: I.B.
Tauris.
Salin, P. (2012). Russia’s three roads to Asia: Why none of them leads to
the right goal. Russia in Global Affairs. <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/
number/Russias-Three-Roads-to-Asia-15818> Accessed 25.06.13.
Smith, H. (2012). Domestic inﬂuences on Russian foreign policy: Status,
interests and ressentiment. In M. R. Freire & R. E. Kanet (Eds.), Russia
and its near neighbours: Identity, interests and foreign policy (pp. 39–62).
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Starr, H. (2013a). On geopolitics: Space, place and international relations.
Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
Starr, H. (2013b). On geopolitics: Spaces and places. International Studies
Quarterly, 57(3), 433–439.
Trenin, D. (2014). Russia’s breakout from the Post-Cold War system: The drivers
of Putin’s course. Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Trenin, D. (2015). From greater Europe to greater Asia? The Sino-Russian
entente. Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Tsygankov, A. P. (2003). Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia’s geopolitical
thinking after the Soviet break-up. Communist and Post-communist
Studies, 36(1), 101–127.
Tsygankov, A. P. (2005a). Finding a civilisational idea: ‘West’, ‘Eurasia’, and
‘Euro-East’ in Russia’s foreign policy. Geopolitics, 12(3), 375–399.
Tsygankov, A. P. (2005b). Vladimir Putin’s vision of Russia as a normal great
power. Post-Soviet Affairs, 21(2), 132–158.
Tsygankov, A. P. (2006). Russia’s foreign policy: Change and continuity in
national identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld.
United Nations Oﬃce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2015).
Ukraine situation update No. 5. <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
ﬁles/resources/ocha_ukraine_situation_update_13_-_26_june_2015
.pdf> Accessed 28.06.
Walker, E. W. (2015). Between east and west: NATO enlargement and the
geopolitics of the Ukraine crisis. In A. Pikulicka-Wilczewska & R. Sakwa
(Eds.), Ukraine and Russia: People, politics, propaganda and perspectives
(pp. 141–154). Bristol: E-IR.
Welch Larson, D., & Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status seekers: Chinese and
Russian responses to U.S. primacy. International Security, 34(4), 63–
95.
Wilson, A. (2014). Ukraine crisis: What it means for the west. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
140 D. Svarin / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 129–140
